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I. EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS
Nancy Zucker Boswell, Managing Director of Transparency International ("TI")-USA, presented an overview on the progress of implementation based on the results of the TI Americas AntiCorruption monitoring program.
Ambassador Miguel Ruiz Cabafias, General Director for North
American Affairs, Mexican Foreign Ministry, described how consensus was reached to create a mutual evaluation mechanism in the
context of the control of drug trafficking.
Ambassador Roberto Casellas, Advisor, International Affairs, Secretariade Contraloria , DesarrolloA dministrativo ("SECODAM"Mexico), addressed the concerns of participating countries in the negotiation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") Convention and its monitoring process and how
they were overcome.
Peter Csonka, Division of Crime Problems, Council of Europe
discussed the mutual evaluation program of the Group of States
against Corruption ("GRECO") and how it plans to address the wide
range of issues covered by the COE Convention.
Michael Davies, Canadian Council for International Business, discussed the importance to the private sector of anti-corruption reform
and the need for consistent, predictable rules.
Selma Estrada, Director, Honduran Office of Administrative Probity, discussed how multilateral cooperation can benefit domestic efforts to reform.
Victoria Figge, former Director, Panamanian Financial Analysis
Unit, provided a perspective on how the Caribbean Financial Action
Task Force ("CFATF") monitoring process has functioned from the
perspective of a participant country.
Marcus Faro de Castro, Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Brasilia, discussed the impact of corruption on human rights.
Jorge Garc[a-Gonzhlez, Director, OAS Department of Legal Cooperation, explained the OAS-International Development Bank
("IDB") project to promote implementation of the Convention's
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criminal law provisions.
Claudio Grossman, Dean of American University, Washington
College of Law and Chairman, Inter-American Human Rights Commission, served as Chairman of the Roundtable and set the stage for
the principal discussants for each topic and facilitated the general
discussion after each presentation. Claudio Grossman also presented
how the Inter-American system for the protection of human rights
operates to secure compliance with relevant international standards.
Daniel Kaufmann, Division Manager, World Bank, presented an
overview of the impact of corruption in the Americas.
Eduardo Roche Lander, Comptroller General of Venezuela, presented Venezuela's experience with implementation of the Convention and anti-corruption reform.
Lucinda A. Low, Member, Council of the Inter-American Bar Association, provided an overview of the provisions of the InterAmerican Convention against Corruption.
Roberto MacLean, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Perii,
described the problem of corruption and judicial systems.
Jennifer McCoy, Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, Carter Center, discussed mutual cooperation among the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government.
Roberto de Michele, Poder Ciudadano, described implementation
of the Convention and anti-corruption reform in Argentina.
Stanley E. Morris, former Director, United States Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, lead the discussion of the best
practices and common characteristics identified in the first day's
presentations.
Mark Pieth, Chair, OECD Working Group on Bribery, discussed
the monitoring program for the OECD Convention on Combating
Foreign Bribery. Six OAS members are signatories to the Convention.
Ambassador Carlos Portales, Permanent Representative of Chile
to the OAS, discussed the Chilean experience on implementation.
Ambassador Beatriz M. Ramacciotti, Permanent Representative of
Per-i to the OAS and Chair of the OAS Working Group on Probity
and Public Ethics, described the Working Group's Program to Im-
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plement the 1999 OAS Resolution on Strengthening Probity in the
Hemisphere.
Herman Schwartz, Professor, American University, Washington
College of Law, elaborated on supervision mechanisms for multilateral agreements on freedom of expression.
Luis Carlos Ugalde, Member, TransparenciaMexicana and Chief
of Staff of the Mexican Embassy, described how implementation of
the Convention has fared in Mexico.
Friedvan Hoof Chairman, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights
and Professor, Utrecht University, presented processes for ensuring
compliance with human rights commitments in the European context.
Raul Vinueza, Professor of Law, University of Buenos Aires, discussed the scope of the Convention.
Calvin Wilson, Executive Director, Caribbean Financial Action
Task Force, discussed the CFATF model for evaluating compliance
with anti-money laundering measures. The discussion considered
how the model facilitates participation by countries despite financial
constraints.
Gustavo Zafra, Dean of the UniversidadJaveriana of Colombia,
discussed the Convention's standards for public procurement.

II. INTRODUCTION
BY CLAUDIO GROSSMAN I

Corruption has devastating financial effects on economies. It distorts the provision of social services; causing contracts to be awarded
to substandard providers and causing inflated costs and cost overruns
in government enterprises. It destroys confidence in a country's financial system, which, in turn, deters investment. It widens the gap
between the rich and the poor.
Official corruption is much more than just a financial problem,
however. It is a violation of human rights. It perpetuates discrimination by providing greater public benefits to those who have the

1. Dean, the American University, Washington College of Law.
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money to offer bribes or "grease money." It prevents the full realization of economic, social, and cultural rights because resources are not
distributed fairly and effectively. By distorting the free will of the
people, it often leads to the infringement of civil and political
rights-such as the right to a fair trial and the right to vote.
In the Western Hemisphere, corruption has undermined legitimate
institutions and economic development. The problem has become so
pervasive that leaders of the hemisphere called for a hemispheric approach to combating corruption at the 1994 Miami Summit of the
Americas. The first step in meeting this objective was the drafting of
the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption. The Convention calls on parties to develop more effective mechanisms to
prevent, detect, and punish corruption and to cooperate in the enforcement of the Convention itself. While seventeen nations have
ratified the Convention and some progress has been achieved, experts agree that to succeed in the implementation of the Convention's
goals, all countries in the region must ratify the Convention and work
toward the development of domestic and regional norms and procedures to ensure compliance.
The American University, Washington College of Law was privileged to host the "Experts Roundtable: A Hemispheric Approach to
Combating Corruption" to address just this issue. In cooperation with
cosponsors Transparency International and the Inter-American Bar
Association, the Washington College of Law succeeded in assembling an impressive group of academics, jurists, diplomats, and attorneys from the region and around the world. The Roundtable examined the effects of corruption in the hemisphere, outlined a
"hemispheric approach" to the problem, and discussed ways to increase the number of ratifications of the Convention as well as to improve adherence to its provisions. A principal conclusion of the
unanimous "Findings, Considerations, and Recommendations" of the
Experts Roundtable was the need for a multilateral monitoring
mechanism to promote implementation and enforcement of the Convention, through the conduct of regular peer review evaluations.
The "Findings, Considerations, and Recommendations" established by the Experts Roundtable will help to forge the path for the
end of corruption in the Americas. The recommendations were submitted to Heads of State and Organization of American States
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("OAS") Ambassadors. They were also formally presented to the
OAS Working Group on Probity at its January 2000 meeting and,
since then, a range of OAS Ambassadors have responded favorably.
A discussion of multilateral follow-up mechanisms was on the
agenda for the Working Group's March 2000 Special Meeting on
Enhancement of Probity and the Fight Against Corruption in the
Hemisphere. It is hoped that the Working Group will recommend
that the OAS General Assembly call for the adoption of a monitoring
mechanism at its June 4-6 meetings in Windsor, Canada. Such action
will infuse new energy into the process of implementing the Convention and will pave the way for even further concrete reforms at
the Third Summit of the Americas in 2001.
The papers that follow reflect the general spirit of the Roundtable
meeting and serve as an introduction to the issue of corruption and
possible responses to it. The papers also provide a feeling of the diversity of perspectives that were available at the Roundtable meeting.
The Program Design outlines the background on tie issue and sets
forth the Roundtable agenda. The foregoing is followed by Lucinda
Low's paper on the scope of the Convention; Ms. Low is a member
of the Council of the Inter-American Bar Association. In the next paper, Ambassador Beatriz Ramacciotti, Permanent Representative of
Peru to the OAS, explains the Inter-American Program against Corruption. Nancy Zucker Boswell, managing director of Transparency
International-USA, follows with her perspective on the role of civil
society in combating corruption.
Next, Stanley Morris, former director of the United States Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, discusses mutual
evaluation in his paper. This is followed by remarks by Ambassador
Claude Heller, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the OAS.
Highlighting the importance of learning from the experiences of
other multilateral institutions, a short piece by Peter Csonka on the
Council of Europe's GRECO program is included. Mr. Csonka is
from the Division of Crime Problems of the Council of Europe. Calvin Wilson, Executive Director of the Caribbean Financial Action
Task Force, describes another model from this hemisphere. Next, a
piece by Victoria Figge, former director of the Panamanian Financial
Analysis Unit, is included, entitled "Best Practices in Multilateral
Implementation." The fimal piece is the "Findings, Considerations,
and Recommendations" that resulted from the Roundtable.
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It will take the cooperation of experts, civil society, governments,
and corporations to achieve the Roundtable's ultimate goal-the
elimination of corruption in the Western Hemisphere. I hope that the
Roundtable and its aftermath, part of which is embodied here, will
succeed in fostering that cooperation.

III. PROGRAM DESIGN
PREPARED BY TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL

A. BACKGROUND
At the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas, the leaders of the
hemisphere agreed that corruption was undermining legitimate institutions and economic development, and they called for a hemispheric approach to combating it. In 1996, OAS members accomplished the first step in meeting this objective when they concluded
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The Convention
calls upon parties to develop more effective mechanisms to prevent,
detect, and punish corruption and to cooperate in its enforcement.
In light of the limited number of signatories to the Convention and
the number of countries that have ratified or implemented the Convention, in June 1999, the OAS General Assembly instructed the
Permanent Council to consider "specific measures to encourage ratification and implementation of the Convention."
Accordingly, the American University, Washington College of
Law, the Inter-American Bar Association, and Transparency International convened a meeting of experts from throughout the Western
Hemisphere to identify approaches to spur progress on implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The
Roundtable was expected to develop recommendations to help carry
out the OAS Resolution.
B. THE ROUNDTABLE AGENDA

As background for the discussions, the Roundtable started with
presentations on the negative impact of corruption in the Hemisphere, the requirements of the Convention, the current status of its
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implementation, and the programs planned by the OAS Working
Group on Probity and the Legal Secretariat.
The Roundtable then moved to a discussion of what specific further steps should be taken to stimulate action across the hemisphere
to achieve a consistent and effective legal and regulatory environment to fight corruption. Recent multilateral initiatives to address
various aspects of corruption, money laundering, and bribery adopted
follow-up monitoring programs in order to secure achievement of
their goals. Presentations were made on follow-up programs for anticorruption, anti-bribery, anti-money laundering, and other agreements in which OAS members already participate, within and outside
the hemisphere. An effort was made to identify a "hemispheric approach" outlining specific steps that signatories could take together
to ensure consistency and progress in implementing the Convention
throughout the hemisphere. Participants evaluated the various approaches presented and considered their compatibility with InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption and the unique concerns
of the nations of the Western Hemisphere in reaching the Roundtable's ultimate "Findings, Considerations, and Recommendations." 2
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of the Roundtable was to identify and address the issues that may arise in establishing a hemispheric approach to promoting and monitoring implementation and enforcement of the Convention and to develop recommendations for the OAS Permanent
Council to consider for adoption by the General Assembly at its thirtieth regular session in 2000. The Roundtable hoped that its action
would re-energize the process so that concrete progress can be reported at the Third Summit of the Americas in 2001.
D. ISSUES
Past discussions of oversight or monitoring of agreements in the
Western Hemisphere have been quite sensitive, raising concerns
ranging from sovereignty to more practical concerns of cost. Furthermore, past actions of the United States, particularly in its antidrug efforts, have created suspicions regarding the United States'
2. See infra Part XII.
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intentions in a monitoring system. Nevertheless, there is widespread
consensus that multilateral agreements do not have effective oversight and seldom meet the goals of their drafters. Indeed, every other
recent anti-corruption initiative has provided for a rigorous monitoring follow-up program. Accordingly, the Roundtable strove to develop recommendations that addressed the unique aspects of the
Convention and the justifiable sensitivities of many nations in the
hemisphere.

IV. THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION
AGAINST CORRUPTION: OVERVIEW AND
STATUS AT THREE YEARS SINCE ITS INCEPTION
BY LUCINDA A. Low & JACQUELINE DE GRAMONT 3

A. INTRODUCTION

On March 29, 1996, the thirty-four-member Organization of
American States ("OAS") approved the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption ("OAS Convention" or "Convention"). The
OAS Convention was the first instrument to establish an international legal framework aimed at eliminating bribery and corruption
of government officials. Twenty-one of the thirty-four OAS Member
States signed the Convention at the March 29 meeting in Caracas,
Venezuela. To date, twenty-six OAS Member States have signed the
Convention and seventeen have ratified it. By participating and promoting the creation and adoption of this first regional instrument under the auspices of the OAS, Latin American countries have taken a
leadership role in the international fight against corruption in the
public sphere.
Since then, on December 17, 1997, twenty-eight Member States of
the OECD and five non-Member State observers to its Working

3. Lucinda A. Low is a member of Miller & Chevalier, Chartered, a member
of the Council of the Inter-American Bar Association, and a director of Transparency International U.S.A. Jacqueline de Gramont is an associate at Miller &
Chevalier, Chartered, in Washington, D.C.
4. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, openedfor signature Mar.
29, 1996, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996) [hereinafter OAS Convention].
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Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, including
six OAS Member States, signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
("OECD Convention").' At the time of this writing, eighteen countries have ratified the OECD Convention, which entered into force
on February 15, 1999.
In addition, on November 4, 1998, the forty Member States of the
Council of Europe and eight observer states approved the text of a
convention on corruption entitled the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption ("Council of Europe Convention"). Twenty-one states
signed the Council of Europe Convention on the day it opened for
signature. At this writing, no states have ratified the Convention.
Lastly, the European Union has adopted its own anti-corruption convention.7 This convention criminalizes the "deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives.., an advantage of any kind" to an EU or
any Member State's official.!
Of these four international instruments, the OAS Convention is the
most ambitious in its attack on public corruption. The OECD Convention is narrowly targeted on the supply side of transnational bribery and closely associated offenses or conduct, for example, money
laundering and accounting. The Council of Europe and European
Union Conventions, although broader than the OECD Convention in
that they cover domestic and foreign official bribery from both the
supply and demand sides, retain a focus on criminalization.' Only the
OAS Convention, on the other hand, focuses on preventive measures

5. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1997, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 1 (1998). Among OAS Member States, Canada, Mexico, and the United
States have ratified the OECD Convention and have enacted implementing legislation. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have signed but not yet ratified the OECD Convention.
6. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. opened for signature Jan. 27,
1999, Council of Europe, Europ. T.S. No. 173.
7. See European Union Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of the Member States of the
European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 195) [hereinafter EU Convention].
8. See id. art. 3.
9. The Council of Europe has also adopted a Civil Law Convention on Corruption (provisional version Sept. 9, 1999).
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in addition to criminalization. As such, it represents a more comprehensive approach to the problem of public corruption.
This paper provides an overview of the OAS Convention and the
status of its ratification and implementation three years after its inception. First, this paper presents the substantive provisions of the
Convention. Second, this paper examines the current ratification and
implementation status of this important regional instrument, and discusses the obstacles to ratification encountered in at least three
countries. Finally, this paper describes several recent positive developments at the OAS level. This last section also addresses the need
for future initiatives-in particular, stronger institutional support
mechanisms-to achieve the ultimate goal: turning the provisions of
the Convention into a reality at the domestic level to reduce or eliminate corruption in the region.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE OAS CONVENTION

The OAS Convention took effect on March 6, 1997, following the
deposit of notices of ratification by Paraguay and Bolivia. The Convention seeks to promote the development and strengthening of legal
mechanisms in signatory countries to "prevent, detect, punish and
eradicate" official corruption and to facilitate cooperation among the
signatories to combat official corruption.' ° The Convention consists
of twenty-eight Articles. The first twenty contain the substantive
provisions of the Convention; the final eight address signature, ratification, reservations, and similar matters. Articles I-V contain general
provisions, including definitions of key terms used in the Convention, and important provisions regarding scope (Article IV) and jurisdiction (Article V). Articles VI-XII set forth the obligations of
states with respect to their domestic laws, while Articles XIII-XX
deal with international corruption, enforcement, and other agreements between State Parties.
The Convention can thus be divided into two spheres-domestic
and multilateral. Certain articles concentrate on the domestic measures on both the "supply" and the "demand" sides that State Parties
need to institute to fight corruption. Other articles target multilateral

10. See OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. II. The Convention does not address private commercial bribery or corruption.
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cooperation to aid national authorities in enforcement of these domestic measures. In both the domestic and multilateral spheres, the
OAS Convention sets forth different levels of obligation. Certain articles are binding on State Parties, others are conditional, still others
are subject to progressive development, and a fourth category are aspirational only. Some of the binding commitments are self-executing,
while others require the Member States to pass new laws, in particular, criminal laws.
The paragraphs that follow review first, the mandatory domestic
measures of the Convention, next, the aspirational domestic measures, and finally, the multilateral measures. Then jurisdictional issues, penalties, and multilateral obligations are reviewed.
1. MandatoyDomestic Measures
The mandatory domestic provisions of the OAS Convention represent a comprehensive assault on bribery. They require State Parties
to criminalize both domestic and foreign bribery and to enact measures to combat the "illicit enrichment" of government officials. The
provisions on domestic bribery are aimed at both the person offering
a bribe and the recipient (active and passive bribery); the foreign
bribery provisions, appropriately, focus on the offeror alone. The recipient is the focus of the illicit enrichment provision.
In Article VI, the Convention identifies a number of activities that
it categorizes as "acts of corruption" and, therefore, fall within the
scope of the Convention." Article VII of the Convention requires,
without qualification, State Parties "that have not yet done so" to
criminalize the specific acts of corruption listed in Article VI(1).
Those acts of corruption include: (1) the solicitation or acceptance,
directly or indirectly, by a government official or a person who performs public functions,'2 of any article of monetary value, or other

11. Cf id. art. XII (providing that for the Convention to apply, no harm to state
property need be caused by these acts).
12. The terms "government" or "public official" and "public function" are defined in Article I of the Convention. A "public official" is "any official or employee of the State or its [agencies/entities], including those who have been selected, appointed, or elected to perform activities in the name of the State or
service of the State, at any level of its hierarchy." Id. As discussed below, there is
some confusion between the English and Spanish versions as to whether the nar-
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benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise, or advantage for himself or for
another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions; (2) the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a government official or a person who performs public functions, of any article of monetary value, or other
benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise, or advantage for himself or for
another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of his public functions; (3) any act or omission in the
discharge by a government official or a person who performs public
functions for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or
for a third party; (4) the fraudulent use or concealment of property
derived from any of the acts referred to in this article; and (5) participation in the commission or attempted commission of, or any
collaboration or conspiracy to commit, any of the acts referred to in
this article. 3
A separate article of the Convention, Article VIII, focuses on foreign, or transnational, bribery. Under this Article, a State Party
agrees to prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its nationals, residents, and businesses domiciled there,
to a government official of another state, of any article of monetary
value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise, or advantage, in
connection with any economic or commercial transaction, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official's
public functions.
The obligation the Convention imposes on states to criminalize
foreign bribery is limited by a potentially significant condition, however: a State Party's obligation to enact foreign bribery measures is
"[s]ubject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system.' 4 Thus, states may use this "escape clause" to avoid imrower word "agencies" or the broader word "entities," which could include stateowned enterprises, is used. "Public function" means "any temporary or permanent,
paid or honorary activity, performed by a natural person in the name of the State or
in the service of the State or its [institutions], at any level of its hierarchy." Id.
13. See id. art. VI(1)(a)-(e).
14. Id. art. VIII. This limitation is primarily directed to those countries that do
not exercise jurisdiction over their national resident or acting outside their territory.
See Organizaci6nde los Estados Americanos, Informe Anual del Comiti Juridico
Interamericanoa la Asamblea General (Elementospara la preparaci6nde legislaci6n mnodelo con respecto al enriquecimiento ilitico y el soborno transnacional
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plementing Article VIII without having to take a reservation to the
Convention. Among those State Parties that do make foreign bribery
an offense, it will be considered an "act of corruption" for purposes
of the Convention, thus triggering the treaty obligations of State Parties. States that have not criminalized foreign bribery are nonetheless
required, "insofar as [their] laws permit," to cooperate with other
State Parties in the enforcement of other states' foreign bribery
laws. 5
The third principal tool of the Convention focuses on illicit enrichment of public officials. Under Article IX, State Parties agree to
establish as an offense "a significant increase in the assets of a government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his
lawful earnings during the performance of his functions.""Ib Like the
foreign bribery offense contemplated in Article VIII, the obligation
of states to do so is subject to their Constitutions and fundamental legal principles. Also like Article VIII, illicit enrichment under Article IX will be considered an "act of corruption" for purposes of the
Convention among those State Parties that do make it an offense,
which means the international obligations imposed by the Convention will be applicable. Those states that have not criminalized illicit
enrichment are required, "insofar as [their] laws permit," to cooperate with other State Parties in the enforcement of other states' laws.
When State Parties adopt legislation criminalizing foreign bribery
and illicit enrichment, they must notify the Secretary-General of the
Organization of American States, which will, in turn, notify the other
State Parties. Those crimes will be considered acts of corruption for
purposes of the Convention thirty days after that notification. "

(CJIIRES.I-1/97)), sec. III(e) (Apr. 17, 1997) [hereinafter "Juridical Committee
Report"].
15. OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. VIII.
16. Id. art. IX.
17. See id. The Convention included this reservation at the insistence of the
United States because of constitutional problems posed by the criminalization of
unjust enrichment. See Part IV.C infra.
18. See OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. X.
19. See id.
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2. AspirationalDomestic Measures
In addition to the binding commitments in Articles VII-IX, State
Parties agree in other provisions of the Convention to consider other
measures of good governance and other anti-corruption provisions,
including the establishment of additional offenses.
Article XI of the Convention enumerates four additional "acts of
corruption" that State Parties agree to consider criminalizing under
domestic law in order to promote uniformity among the Member
States and to further the purposes of the Convention. These acts,
which are subject to progressive development, are: (1) the improper
use of information by government officials; (2) the improper use of
state property by a government official; (3) the attempt by any person, directly or indirectly, to obtain illicit benefits for himself or any
other person; and (4) the diversion of state property for personal
benefit.20
Once a State Party establishes any of these acts as a criminal offense, it will be considered an act of corruption for purposes of the
Convention and will trigger the international obligations of the State
Parties under the Convention. State Parties that do not enact such
laws are required, consistent with their domestic laws, to assist other
State Parties with respect to those offenses."1
Under Article III, which contains the "softest" measures in the hierarchy of the Convention, State Parties agree to consider preventive
measures to "create, maintain, and strengthen" their domestic laws.
These preventive measures fall into four primary areas. First, State
Parties agree to consider measures relating to transparency and accountability in government procurement and functions. In particular,
State Parties agree to consider measures relating to the government
procurement and government hiring processes to ensure their "openness, equity, and efficiency," and similar measures relating to the
government revenue collection and control systems that "deter corruption."" State Parties also agree to consider systems for registering
the income, assets, and liabilities of certain public officials and,

20. See id. art. XI(1)(a)-(d).
21. See id. art. XI(2)-(3).
22. See id. art. III(5)-(6).
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where appropriate, to make that information public.2 '
Second, State Parties agree to consider measures to create, maintain, and strengthen ethics rules applicable to public officials. In particular, these include: standards of conduct for the "correct, honorable, and proper fulfillment of public functions"; standards to prevent
conflicts of interest; standards to "mandate the proper conservation
and use of resources entrusted to government officials"; and standards to require government officials to report acts of corruption to
the appropriate authorities. 4
Third, State Parties agree to consider measures to create, maintain,
and strengthen prophylactic safeguards against corrupt activities by
private concerns. In particular, State Parties agree to consider laws
that deny favorable tax treatment for expenditures made in violation
of the State Parties' anti-corruption laws." They also agree to consider mechanisms to ensure that publicly-held companies and similar
organizations "maintain books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately reflect the acquisition and disposition of assets, and
have sufficient internal accounting controls to enable their officers to
detect corrupt acts. 26
The fourth set of preventive measures is diverse. State Parties
agree to consider measures to protect public servants and private citizens who report acts of corruption ("whistleblowers"), including
protection of their identities, in accordance with the basic principles
of State Parties' domestic legal systems." Finally, State Parties agree
to consider measures to advance the anti-corruption effort, including
anti-corruption oversight bodies, programs to encourage broader involvement in the effort, and further measures that account for the
correlation between "equitable compensation and probity [honesty]
in public service. ' '2

23. See OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. 111(4).
24. See id. art. 111(1)-(3).

25. See id. art. Ii(7).
26. Id. art. 111(10).

27. See id. art. 1(8).
28. See OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. 111(9), (11 )-(12).
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3. Jurisdiction and Penalties
The delineation of the activities to be criminalized is one critical
part of the Convention. A second part that affects its scope is the jurisdictional provisions. Here, the Convention aspires to be inclusive
and accommodating of the differing principles of personal jurisdiction applicable in Member States, while giving primacy to the principle of territoriality. The Convention requires that State Parties
adopt measures to establish their jurisdiction over Convention offenses (a) committed in their territory, and (b) when the alleged
criminal is present in their territory, but not extradited to another
state due to nationality. 29 In addition, State Parties may adopt measures to establish jurisdiction over those offenses committed by their
nationals or residents, whether or not those crimes were committed
inside their territory. The Convention also explicitly preserves the
established rules of criminal jurisdiction of State Parties under their
domestic laws.3 ° In requiring criminalization of the array of acts just
reviewed, the Convention does not specify the penalties that State
Parties must impose for their violation.
4. MultilateralObligations
The Convention's multilateral framework consists primarily of
mandatory obligations to cooperate and assist other State Parties in
the prosecution of foreign and domestic corruption. Some of the recommended actions are general, for example, to "foster exchanges of
experiences by way of agreements and meetings."'" Others, such as
the extradition provisions, are specific and quite important to effective enforcement.
The extradition provisions are set out in Article XIII. They apply
only to the "acts of corruption" established by the State Parties as offenses in accordance with the Convention.32 Under Article XIII, the
Convention extends existing extradition treaties among State Parties
to include the offenses established under the Convention. State Par29. See id. art. V(1), (3).
30. See id. art. V(4).
31.

Id. art. XIV(2).

32. Thus, they would include any of the acts specified in Articles VI, VIII, IX,
or XI.
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ties further undertake to include these offenses in any future extradition treaties.33 The Convention can also serve as a self-executing extradition treaty among the State Parties that have not concluded extradition treaties with one another, or which do not condition
extradition on the existence of such treaties."
The Convention emphasizes cooperation among State Parties in
the pursuit of the Convention's anti-corruption goals. In addition to
the specific requirements of cooperation already mentioned under
Articles VIII and IX, under Article XIV, State Parties agree to "afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance" in preventive, investigative, and enforcement efforts, "[i]n accordance with
their domestic laws and applicable treaties."" The mutual assistance
article thus looks to existing treaties and domestic laws to define the
content of the State Parties' obligations, rather than enlarging them,
as the extradition provision does.
In two potentially very important provisions, the Convention prohibits the use of bank secrecy laws or the allegedly political nature of
an act of corruption as a basis for refusing to cooperate with other
State Parties.36
The Convention specifically provides for cooperation among the
State Parties in the seizure and forfeiture of assets connected with
"acts of corruption," both domestic and foreign. Under Article XV,
State Parties agree to provide each other "the broadest possible
measure of assistance in the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure
and forfeiture of property or proceeds obtained, derived from or used
in the commission of offenses" established in accordance with the
Convention.37 Article XV suggests that State Parties may want to
transfer all or part of properties or proceeds to other State Parties if
doing so would assist in an underlying investigation or proceeding.

33. See OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. XIII(2).
34. See id. art. XIII(3)-(4).
35. Id. art. XIV.
36. See id. arts. XVI, XVII.
37. See id. art. XV.
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C. RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION STATUS
The adoption of the OAS Convention by twenty-six countries represents a major achievement. Ratification and implementation, however, have faced a number of obstacles. This Section describes those
obstacles and the efforts underway to overcome them.
Under the Convention, the ratification of only two countries was
necessary for the Convention to enter into force.38 The Convention
met this standard within a year of its adoption. However, progress in
ratification by all of the countries that signed the treaty has been
slow. To date, although twenty-six countries have signed the Convention, only seventeen countries have deposited their instruments of
ratification with the OAS.39 The reasons for not ratifying the Convention vary from country to country, but include absence of a deadline for ratification, internal procedural hurdles, constitutional concerns over certain provisions, and, perhaps most importantly,
concern over the lack of institutional support for implementation and
enforcement, discussed below.
Unlike the OECD and Council of Europe Conventions, the OAS
Convention does not provide for any institutional oversight or support for its implementation by State Parties.4 ' This is a considerable
gap, especially when the scope of the Convention is considered.
What should the priorities be among all the areas addressed by the
Convention? How should criminal laws be drafted or amended to en-

38. See OAS Convention, supra note 4, art. XV.
39. The Convention permits countries to take reservations when ratifying it,
provided such reservations are not incompatible with the "object and purpose of
the Convention." See id. art. XXIV. To date, only Panama has taken a reservation
in which it states that it does not consider itself bound to seize or forfeit property

under Article XV to the extent that such actions violate Article 30 of the Panamanian Constitution.
40. The OECD Convention provides that monitoring shall be done within the
framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions. The current terms of reference of the OECD Working Group on
Bribery that are relevant to monitoring and follow-up are set out in Section VIII of
the 1997 OECD Recommendation. Under the Council of Europe Convention, the
Group of States Against Corruption ("GRECO") is the institutional structure
charged with monitoring the implementation of the Convention. Ratifying states
automatically become a member of GRECO on the date the Convention enters into
force.
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sure that maximum benefit is derived from the cooperation mechanisms of the Convention? When is harmonization possible or desirable? How should enforcement efforts be prioritized, and are there
common capacity-building issues? These are all questions that an institutional support mechanism could help resolve. However, the OAS
Members did not focus on the adoption of an institutional support
mechanism during the negotiations of the Convention.
The monitoring mechanism in the OECD Convention has been
important in gaining the support of many countries for that agreement, and may explain why the OECD Convention has achieved
broader adherence than the OAS Convention in a shorter time frame.
The monitoring process established under the OECD Convention includes: (1) self-evaluation of implementing legislation by reference
to a detailed OECD questionnaire; (2) peer review of those responses; (3) on-site review of enforcement by a team of experts
drawn from participating nations; and (4) consideration of their reports at plenary meetings. The adoption of a monitoring mechanism
and other components of "institutional support" will help ensure not
only the ratification but also the implementation of the OAS Convention.
D. CONCLUSION

The OAS Convention is a path-breaking instrument in the development of international standards to combat public corruption, the
provision of mechanisms for holding violators accountable, and the
establishment of a comprehensive preventive work program. Both
panelists and audience participants during a recent workshop on the
OAS Convention presented at the Inter-American Bar Association's
XXXV Conference in Mexico City reiterated that the key goal now
is to turn the provisions of the Convention into a reality at the domestic level, where they will affect behavior and effectively address
the problem of corruption. The provision of institutional support on
the part of the OAS, in conjunction with assistance of the InterAmerican Development Bank, will provide a beneficial source of information and technical advice in the area of criminology, especially
to those countries that are just starting their implementation process.
To turn the full range of the Convention's provisions into reality at
the domestic level, however, the development of more formal,
broader, and sustained institutional support mechanisms are likely to
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be necessary.

V. STRENGTHENING PROBITY AND PUBLIC
ETHICS IN THE OAS FRAMEWORK:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
PROGRAM OF COOPERATION TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION
BY AMBASSADOR BEATRIZ

4
M. RAMACCIOTTI 1

A. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this presentation is to present the most important
activities that are underway at the principal regional political forum,
the Organization of American States ("OAS"), on the subject of probity, public ethics and the fight against corruption. Prior to an indepth discussion of the subject, I would like to point out by way of
introduction that we recognize that corruption, as our Heads of State
and Government reaffirmed in the Summits of the Americas, in Miami in 1994 and Santiago in 1998, represents one of the most serious
threats to the consolidation of democracy and to the social and economic development of our countries. For this and other reasons, we
at the OAS are convinced that the subjects of probity and its counterpart, corruption, must be addressed and discussed at all levels. We
must be aware of the dimensions of the problem, and not just because it has become a concern at different levels and sectors, but also
so that we are prepared to act on short-, medium-, and long-term
strategies and to take concrete actions at institutional and personal,
domestic and international levels.
It is first necessary to note that at the OAS, the fight against corruption takes place within a broader political framework, given the
problems we are experiencing and the challenges that our societies
must face in the future decades. Corruption, the fight against drugs,
terrorism, violence, and poverty in its various forms are not isolated

41. Permanent Representative from Peri to the OAS and President of OAS
Working Group on Probity and Civic Ethics.
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issues, and they cannot be handled independently in the context of a
society marked by globalization and interdependence. On the contrary, these problems are interrelated and require an integral approach, based on a humanistic and democratic vision, with clear values and principles focused on the human being.
I do not mean to say that addressing each of these specific challenges requires a specific technical and legal approach with predetermined strategies and actions. However, an essential premise is the
need for an integral approach and a basic consensus that allow us to
address these issues collectively, cooperatively, and efficiently. With
respect to corruption, the governments of the hemisphere are well
aware of the damaging ramifications of this illicit phenomenon. In
the political context, corruption produces a progressive decrease in
the legitimacy of the system, in our case the democratic system, and
of our public institutions, which generates distrust and a lack of confidence in the integrity of public administration. At the social level,
corruption demoralizes our citizens and our civil society, and creates
conflict between this sector and the government. Corruption acts as a
disincentive to honest work, and impedes social advancement that is
based on individual merit. Corruption increases inequalities by diverting public funds destined for social development to the enrichment of private interests. At the economic level, corruption increases
the cost of public services, generates administrative obstacles, reduces government income, encourages unjustified public expense,
increases fiscal budget deficits, permits unfair competition, increases
the cost of products, and causes market distortions.
To address, therefore, the concrete challenges of anti-corruption
reform, we believe that multilateralism is an essential means of
fighting corruption, with examples such as the Summits of the
Americas and other regional initiatives undertaken by the OAS and
Inter-American Development Bank. In addition, information exchange through seminars, roundtable discussions, and workshops,
such as today's important event in an academic environment, at the
American University, Washington College of Law, is essential. We
are convinced that this is the right way, the permanent exchange of
ideas, opinions, and potential measures to be adopted and implemented, with the goal of facilitating the coordination of policies and
varied courses of action, in a fruitful collaboration of governments
and civil society organizations, in order to work together with com-
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mon objectives and strategies.
B. THE OAS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

In the context of its larger commitment to work to strengthen
democratic institutions, the rule of law, free markets, and fundamental human rights protections, the OAS has made consistent progress
since the beginning of the 1990s in the fight against corruption, reinforced by the specific mandates established at the Summits of the
Americas. The basic starting points that have oriented this work are
the following: (1) the necessity to analyze the problem and design a
hemispheric integral strategy to fight corruption; (2) the need to simultaneously address individual conduct and systemic issues, in
other words the problem of systemic characteristics that encourage
illicit behavior; (3) the fight against corruption is a process that requires a consistent effort, and decision-making at different levels;
and (4) that all of us have responsibilities in the fight against corruption and the strengthening of probity and public ethics: governments,
the private sector, civic society, and international organizations.
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption, adopted in
Caracas in 1996, is without a doubt, the most important step taken in
this hemisphere in the fight against corruption. The Convention represents the political commitment of governments to face the phenomenon and the consensus for a collective strategy. It is an objective framework that assists countries in advancing simultaneously in
various fundamental areas. The Convention, taking into account the
four previously-mentioned starting points, contains two major objectives and courses of action. First, domestically, the requirement that
States develop sufficient mechanisms to prevent and punish corruption. Second, internationally, the promotion and facilitation of cooperation among State Parties so that we work from a shared process, a
joint strategy, and not through isolated, uncoordinated action. To that
end, the Convention contains definitions concerning acts of corruption, national legislation, preventive measures, and even transnational bribery, illegal enrichment, bank secrecy, extradition, legal and
judicial assistance, and guidelines for progressive development.
To date, seventeen of the thirty-four OAS members have signed
the Convention. In addition, the Convention allows for accession by
other countries. Taking the Convention as the point of reference for
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the actions that governments should undertake, in association with
civil society, as well as for the areas of international cooperation, the
next step taken in the OAS was the adoption, by the General Assembly in Lima in 1997, of the "Inter-American Program for Cooperation in the Fight against Corruption," with the ultimate objective of
implementing the Convention. This program encompasses four thematic areas: legal, institutional, coordination among international organizations, and relationships with civil society.
Some of the measures that we would like emphasize are, for example, the following. First, actions that will ensure the complete ratification of the Convention by Member States and even other countries, such as observer countries to the OAS (currently forty), as the
vehicle for a clear and verifiable commitment to fight corruption.
Second, the implementation and enforcement in national law of the
criminal prohibitions on corrupt practices, including specific crimes
such as transnational bribery. To that end, we are compiling domestic
laws, conducting comparative studies, and designing model laws
(Inter-American Juridical Committee, in the areas of international
bribery and illegal enrichment), with the goal of harmonizing internal
laws to the extent possible and facilitating legal and judicial cooperation.
Third, another important area is the promotion of ethical values,
probity in public service, and in general, codes of conduct for public
officials, not only through formal means, such as training workshops,
but also informally. Fourth, we must also advance with determination in the modernization of public administration, within the context
of the modem state, with institutions and rules that simplify procedures and requirements and are consistent with the development of
our social and economic life. We must establish transparency in
public administration through effective systems for hiring and promotion of government officials, based on merit and incentives for
productivity, and through clear and precise disciplinary systems and
internal control mechanisms. Fifth, another fundamental aspect of the
program is the participation of civil society.
Governments should work with professional and labor associations, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), and the press, to
create a means for controlling corruption and promoting ethical values. Citizen participation is essential in the fight against corruption.
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Finally, another important aspect is the need for coordination of the
projects and initiatives that are being developed by the varied international agencies and organizations involved in the issue. The
OECD, the Council of Europe, the UN, the IDB, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and others are following the
issue and undertaking concrete programs. We should establish a consultation system to reinforce our anti-corruption strategies, avoid duplication of efforts and evaluate the possibility of carrying out joint
projects.
Within the context of the Inter-American Program, specific actions
are underway, including the following: (1) workshops and conferences on the dissemination and implementation of the Convention.
Among them, it is worth highlighting the "Symposium on Strengthening Probity in the Hemisphere" held in Chile in 1998; (2) the creation of an online "Inter-American Network against Corruption," with
the most important legal instruments on the issue (Convention, Declarations, Resolutions, institutions, and national experts) and with
ongoing incorporation of information on anti-corruption activities in
the hemisphere; and (3) a cooperation agreement with the IDB to Lindertake anti-corruption projects, including for example the analysis
of whether countries' criminal laws conform to the requirements of
the Convention, with the goal of identifying and suggesting the necessary modifications.
Likewise, in the "Working Group on Probity and Public Ethics,"
reactivated in 1999 by the Permanent Council, members are planning
activities to move forward on the Inter-American Program, in the
spirit of the Convention. Among the activities contemplated are:
first, moving forward on actions towards the prompt ratification of
the Convention by all member states of the OAS and accession by
observer countries; and second, facilitating holding regional and subregional courses and seminars designed to promote both the Convention's preventive measures and Inter-American cooperation to
combat corruption, bringing not only government officials but the
private sector and civil society to the table.
These seminars should address topics such as: (1) mechanisms to
simplify administrative functions and eliminate arbitrary procedures,
licenses, and regulations; (2) conditions that permit the abuse of
power and the lack of accountability, and the mechanisms necessary
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to create accountability; (3) systems for the execution projects with
international funding; (4) parameters and controls for the exercise of
public functions (codes of conduct); (5) financial contributions to
political parties; (6) effectiveness of government oversight institutions (e.g., comptrollerships); (7) systems for making information
available to citizens, to facilitate public participation in the fight
against corruption; (8) promote that the government, through diverse
means, and with the support of civil society, undertakes to carry out
training courses in efficient and clean public management, create
codes of conduct, and design oversight mechanisms with active public participation-all of this will help to develop a culture of integrity; (9) strengthen the "Inter-American Network against Corruption," not only focusing on governmental actions but also actions by
non-governmental actors, such as Transparency International; and
(10) move forward in the coordination of actions with other hemispheric and international organizations (IDB, World Bank, OECD,
UN, etc.)
C. FINAL REFLECTION

At the OAS, we are working intensively to address this problem
that, as a systemic problem, cannot be resolved solely with sanctions
or punitive measures. It requires decisions such as the modernization
of institutions, the eradication of the causes of corruption and of the
conditions that facilitate and ease the way for corruption, and the
strengthening of probity and public ethics. With the elements of the
Inter-American Program, we must build our citizens' confidence, by
assuring the efficient, transparent, and effective management of public affairs, of national institutions, and of governments and our officials, at every level.
As we begin the new millennium, we should take this opportunity
to reflect together, at every level, on the challenges that corruption
poses for our societies, in the context of the larger set of complex and
interrelated challenges. We must address them with common values,
principles, and strategies if our hope that this new millennium is
characterized by a return to humanism is to be achieved-in other
words, that the millennium brings an ever stronger possibility that
every human being, man, woman, and child, can have the possibility
of living in peace, democracy, and increasing material and spiritual
development and well-being. This is what we desire, and this is what
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we are trying to build.

VI. A HEMISPHERIC APPROACH TO COMBATING
CORRUPTION:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
BY NANCY ZUCKER BOSWELL

42

A. INTRODUCTION
Since its founding in 1993, Transparency International ("TI") has
given voice to civil society's demand for anti-corruption reform. TI
national chapters have contributed to the significant progress that has
been achieved, first, in raising awareness at the highest political levels about the damage caused by corruption, and second, in securing
consensus on common standards of governance and accountability
that can enhance economic, social, and political development.
In recent years, many of those common standards have been codified into multilateral anti-corruption conventions that provide a
framework for systemic reform. However, translating conventions
from diplomatic prose to practical reality is difficult in any context
and even more so when the subject matter is corruption. The task
may be even more difficult when there is a widely-held view that,
despite a plethora of laws, corruption persists because of inadequate
enforcement and impunity.
This challenge was considered by the more than 1600 delegates
from 134 countries who participated in the 9th International AntiCorruption Conference held October 10-15, 1999 in Durban, South
Africa. In his remarks to the delegates, UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan proposed two guiding principles:
First, we must recognize that corruption is a problem that transcends national borders and is beyond the power of any single nation
to address on its own.
42. Managing Director, Transparency International-USA.
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Second, "[p]rogress in the years ahead will require unprecedented
levels of cooperation and collaboration among peoples of different
cultures, religions, and values."
These principles were recognized as early as 1994, when the leaders of this hemisphere met at the Miami Summit of the Americas .
They recognized that corruption was undermining sustainable economic growth, equitable development, and political stability in the
region and that combating it was beyond the power of any single nation. They called for a "hemispheric approach."' Their boldness in
bringing the issue of corruption out in the open and their unity in defining a regional agenda inspired the conclusion of the OAS InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption ' : ("Convention") less than
two years later.
The OAS Convention, concluded in 1996, was the first hemispheric approach to corruption. This groundbreaking agreement was
the first comprehensive regional framework of measures to "prevent,
detect, punish, and eradicate" official corruption. "'
Its rapid conclusion reflected the consensus among government
leaders, the private sector, and citizens across the hemisphere that
addressing bribery and corruption should be a top priority. However,
the negotiators of the Convention failed to explicitly provide for a
follow-up mechanism to ensure the continued hemispheric cooperation that the leaders had envisaged.
Consequently, when the heads of state met again at the 1998
Summit in Santiago, less than one dozen nations had ratified the
Convention and there were few examples of implementation. The
leaders tried to re-energize the process by calling for a symposium to

43. In the words of the OAS Office of Summit Follow-up website, "the Summit of the Americas process is an institutionalized set of meetings at the highest
level of government decision-making in the Western Hemisphere. The purpose of
the meetings is to discuss common issues and seek solutions to problems shared by
all the countries in the Americas, be they economic, social, military or political in
nature."
44. Plan of Action, Summit of the Americas, para. 5, Miami, Fla., Dec. 9-11,
1994.
45. Inter-American Convention against Corruption, May 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724.
46. Id. art. II, sec. 2.

788

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[15:759

restart the implementation process and for increased public participation.
But in the absence of an ongoing, systematic, and participatory
mechanism to promote progress, there has been little action. A report
compiled by TI chapters across the Americas provides a snapshot of
regional progress to date on implementation of key provisions of the
Convention. While there is evidence that some steps have been
taken, the results overall are disappointing:
Only twenty-six OAS members have signed and half have not ratified the Convention. Neither the United States, Brazil, nor Canada
has ratified;
Until the entry into force of the OECD Convention Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials ("OECD Convention"), 47 only the
United States had criminalized transnational bribery. This year, Canada and Mexico enacted legislation, but action is still pending in
other signatories in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile);
Of the important preventive measures called for in Article III, only
a half dozen countries have codes of conduct for public officials,
and, of those, not all have conflict-of-interest standards;
Fewer than half require public disclosure of assets and, of those,
some apply only to certain officials or certain types of assets;
Less than a dozen countries have transparency provisions in their
procurement laws, and even those are not uniform, comprehensive,
or readily-available to the public;
Finally, there is too little access to information, which is required
for effective monitoring and democratic participation. While many
countries provide citizens a right to information, few have effective
procedures to permit citizens to actually obtain information and
fewer still provide for regular and timely publication of information
or public hearings.
The Experts Roundtable is a civil society initiative devoted to consideration of how to make the next stage of a "hemispheric approach" effective. The challenge is how to secure prompt ratification
and effective implementation and enforcement as well.
47. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
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Experience in other fora makes it clear that moving expeditiously
from many commendable national initiatives to a region where the
rules are transparent, consistent, and predictable, will require unprecedented levels of cooperation among governments and with civil
society.
1. CooperationAmong Governments
There is ample evidence of a new degree of cooperation among
governments. At the OECD, members adopted the OECD Convention, a critical element of the transnational cooperation that is needed
to stop illicit payments that flow across borders from the industrialized world into developing nations. Effective restrictions on OECDbased companies, which account for over seventy percent of world
exports and over ninety percent of foreign direct investment, will
support anti-corruption efforts in this hemisphere and others in which
they do business.
Parties to the OECD Convention recognized the need for a coordinated, institution-based approach to follow-up and agreed to participate in a cooperative, peer review process to ensure consistent implementation. The six OAS members (Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Mexico, and the United States) that are signatories to the
OECD Convention must participate in that process and will have
their implementing legislation reviewed.
There are other similar peer review processes, such as the Group
of States Against Corruption at the Council of Europe ("GRECO"),
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Commission Mutual Evaluation Mechanism. Asia Pacific Economic Coordination ("APEC") member economies have
called for rigorous peer review to promote action on transparency
and good governance commitments that are the centerpiece of their
post-crisis reform efforts. APEC-member economies include five
OAS members, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and the United States.
There is a clear and growing consensus that effective follow-up
can be achieved with a peer review process supported by all parties,
and many OAS members are already participating in such processes.
Consideration should be given to such a process in this hemisphere
in order to foster a regional, legal, and regulatory environment that
maximizes resources, attracts investment, and restores confidence in
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public institutions.
Since the conclusion of the Convention, Transparency International has urged the creation of a follow-up mechanism to promote
concrete progress because of its concern that without such a cooperative, institutional mechanism, reform will be slow and uneven.
The OAS is the logical forum for a regional follow-up effort since
it has the institutional framework and can marshal the financial and
human resources that the process will require. There are many reasons why it is needed:
First, implementing the Convention requires numerous changes in
each nation's laws and practices, and numerous agencies and ministries will be responsible for enforcement. A multilateral body can
provide technical expertise and a coordinating function.
Second, the level of domestic political support for enforcement
may also vary. An agreed-upon institutional process can assure continuity and enhance public confidence. The track record for implementation of conventions generally is not reassuring, with many
signed and then left to wither. Specific steps and timetables are
needed to counter the understandable skepticism that conventions are
nothing more than paper promises.
Third, in this field, action is more difficult and peer pressure more
important because countries will watch each other; progress in one
country may spur reform in another whereas failure to act may be
used by a neighbor to justify doing nothing.
Finally, effective follow-up is particularly critical for fighting corruption, since corrupt officials as well as companies and their agents
have a vested interest in the status quo.
2. Cooperationwith Civil Society
Civil society has been the driving force in overcoming the status
quo, particularly in the fight against corruption. Civil society pressure has ousted corrupt leaders from office and landed corrupt corporate officials in jail.
Even reform-minded governments and institutions need strong allies for sustainable reform. Governments cannot implement the Convention alone. There must be broad public support and the involvement of business, legal, and accounting professionals.
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There are several ways to accomplish this. First, civil society has
an important oversight role. The TI National Chapters Progress Report provides the information that civil society needs to make an assessment of actual progress on implementation so that it can hold
governments accountable. Currently, the report provides a snapshot
of progress. As legislation is enacted, it will assess the quality of that
legislation and, ultimately, the extent of its enforcement.
Second, a government-to-government peer review process will be
more effective if it is open to input from the private sector and civil
society. A process that only provides for governments to monitor
each other behind closed doors will have limited results. Officials
may have other priorities that impede their willingness to criticize
non-compliant governments. Without oversight, there may be a tendency to accept the least common denominator. There are reasons
why certain parts of the process may require some degree of confidentiality, but there should be a presumption of transparency. A
transparent process that permits public oversight provides a more effective catalyst for action.
Third, civil society and the private sector in particular have valuable insights and expertise. At the OECD, for example, TI contributed its expertise on selected issues, such as accounting and auditing,
during the negotiation of the Convention. TI has made submissions
on aspects of the monitoring process, and TI national chapters have
been providing their analysis of domestic implementing legislation.
The OAS deserves credit for the steps it has taken to increase the
participation of civil society in policy formulation and programs. For
example, the OAS was a key supporter of the November 1997 meeting on "The Role of Public Participation in Development and the
Eradication of Poverty," which brought together civil society and
government representatives to formulate recommendations to the
preparatory bodies of the Santiago Summit. TI also provided recommendations to the November 1998 OAS Symposium on Strengthening Probity in the Hemisphere. Recently, the OAS formulated procedures for civil society group registration and participation in official
OAS meetings. However, more needs to be done to broaden opportunities at the national and local levels and to provide the necessary
access to information to make such participation meaningful.
Finally, the Experts Roundtable is a clear example of the positive
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impact that civil society participation can have. The recommendations of the Roundtable will be submitted to the OAS and will enhance the prospects that the promises made in Miami in 1994 will be
tangible reforms by the time leaders meet again at the next Summit
of the Americas in 2001. Working together, civil society and governments can forge an effective hemispheric follow-up process that
will turn these promises into reality.

VII. MUTUAL EVALUATION SYSTEMS: AN
APPROACH TO ENSURING PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
BY STANLEY E. MORRIS

48

A. INTRODUCTION
The "Experts Roundtable: A Hemispheric Approach to Combating
Corruption" met to discuss an issue of great importance and immediacy in the region. The challenge the experts confronted goes further
than re-energizing action on the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption. The globalization of trade and investment requires signatories to all such multilateral efforts to not only adopt the best
policies but to carry them out consistently. This helps ensure a more
predictable legal and regulatory environment for law enforcement officials as well as private investors and avoids creating competitive
disadvantages among the signatories.
In such areas as corruption, financial crimes, money laundering,
bribery, and procurement fraud, where money flows across borders,
it is not enough merely to agree to internationally accepted standards.
They must be implemented consistently, effectively, and fairly by all
nations.
This was a key priority for representatives of over one hundred

48. The author was the former Director of the United States Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and headed the United States delegation to the FATF. He has served as an expert FATF evaluator for Italy and Aus-

tralia, coordinated the FATF evaluation of the United States, and was a Council of
Europe evaluator of Cyprus. He has been a consultant to the Council of Europe and
is a Director of Transparency International-USA.
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countries attending the recent ninth International Anti-Corruption
Conference in Durban, South Africa. The "Durban Commitment to
Effective Action Against Corruption" declares that "monitoring will
be a vital element to promote consistency and cooperation."
As the Experts sought to develop recommendations appropriate for
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, they considered
the experience of nations in this hemisphere and elsewhere who have
adopted monitoring systems. The Financial Action Task Force
("FATF") system for money laundering has become the model for
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and the Council of
Europe. The OAS is developing a modified version as part of the
Summit of the Americas' initiative to deal with the drug issue. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") has also established a system based on FATF to promote
consistent and effective enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention. This Convention requires signatories, including the six
OAS members, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the
United States, to participate in the monitoring process. The system
has been in effect since the Convention's entry into force in February
1999.
This paper focuses on the goals of such systems and provides a
summary of the key elements of the FATF process on which they are
modeled.
B. THE GOALS OF MUTUAL EVALUATION

There are at least four goals served by a mutual evaluation system:
(1) to increase knowledge among signatories; (2) to promote progress and consistency; (3) to identify and address problems with compliance; and (4) to build momentum for corrective action. To achieve
these goals, successful mutual evaluation efforts must pay careful
attention to concerns regarding each nation's sovereignty and establish mutual respect among the officials from each nation involved in
the process.
1. hIcreasingKnowledge
The complexity of many international problems has led to increasingly complex international arrangements to address them. For
example, to address the issue of money laundering, the G-7 created a
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FATF to develop international standards. The forty recommendations
of the FATF require action by Central Banks, Finance, Justice and
Interior Ministries as well as the private financial sector. Thus, for
ten years the twenty-six nations that make up the FATF have met
four times a year to share experiences and monitor progress through
a program of mutual evaluation. While the United States and Canada
were originally the only members from the Western Hemisphere, recently Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have joined the Task Force.
Representatives from all of the appropriate ministries attend these
sessions.
Each nation reports annually on its progress towards implementing
the agreement, and these self-assessments are summarized by a small
Secretariat and distributed to all participating nations. Meetings permit discussion of both problems and successes in implementation.
This increases the participants' knowledge and expertise and helps
surface ideas for innovative approaches. On-site expert evaluations
also identify important issues, which expand the understanding of the
problem and the way various nations are attempting to address it.
Identifying innovative approaches that have succeeded in other
countries also provides the government representatives involved in
the process with tools to be used within their own nation.
A separate annual meeting is held to focus exclusively on how
money launderers are attempting to circumvent FATF actions. This
examination of money-laundering patterns and trends is attended by
law enforcement experts from around the world who bring recent
cases and experiences to help the FATF determine where it is succeeding and failing.
2. PromotingProgressand Consistency
There is no substitute for comprehensive, regular, and candid assessments of the status of implementing international agreements.
Views as to their priority may vary with changes in political leadership. There are too many international agreements that simply sit
gathering dust in international libraries because no follow-up monitoring mechanism was created. Furthermore, agreements such as the
Inter-American Convention address a series of complex issues, requiring action by many different government agencies. Some may
have higher day-to-day priorities. Regular monitoring of progress

2000]

EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE

helps keep the issue at the top of the agenda. Finally, the monitoring
process permits an assessment of overall implementation as well as
the status of individual nations' progress and this helps promote consistency in legal and regulatory regimes, ultimately providing greater
predictability to law enforcement officials and private investors.
3. Identifj,ing Problems
The examination process will inevitably reveal problems in the
substance or pace of implementation. Consequently, a comprehensive review can identify where the shortcomings occur, who is in the
best position to remedy them, and what should be the priorities for
reform. The fact that every nation is going through the process, and
every evaluation identifies successes and failures, permits the officials who have primary responsibility in the nation for the initiative
to broaden attention to the problem. For example, during the mutual
evaluation of Costa Rica, officials from that nation encouraged the
Caribbean Financial Task Force to be very rigorous in order to provide a better understanding of the problem within their government.
In addition to identifying problems of compliance within nations,
mutual evaluation also permits an opportunity to assess the overall
picture; for example, whether corruption or money laundering is increasing or decreasing and how is it being carried out. This, in turn,
permits an assessment of what adjustments are needed to address the
changing character of the problem.
4. Achieving CorrectiveAction
The process of mutual evaluation can serve to strengthen the role
of those officials who are attempting to increase the priority for reform within the government. In the author's experience as an expert
FATF evaluator for Italy and Australia, a Council of Europe evaluator for Cyprus, and coordinator of the FATF evaluation of the United
States, in every case, officials of the country being evaluated candidly identified problems. The evaluation was seen as an opportunity
not to avoid criticism but instead to encourage corrective action.
Regular progress reports and on-site evaluations help maintain the
momentum for change. Even the natural and healthy competitiveness
between nations can serve to stimulate progress. It is interesting to
note that countries criticized for weak anti-money laundering re-
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gimes have used the mutual evaluation process to achieve reform and
correct impressions. Switzerland served as an early President of the
FATF; Panama and the Cayman Islands have been leaders in the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and Cyprus has played a key
role in the development of the Council of Europe's program.
The challenge for the nations participating in the mutual evaluation system is to maintain its credibility. If the processes are seen as
fair and decisions are reached through consensus, then the results of
the efforts will have increased credibility. Public pronouncements
will have the weight of all participating nations and this is critical to
the success of the endeavor.
C. CONCLUSION

I hope that this brief background will be of use to the Experts
Roundtable as it develops recommendations for ensuring progress in
the implementation and enforcement of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. While several organizations have moved to
adopt the concept of mutual evaluation, it is clear that no one system
fits all needs and differences must be respected. For example, the
FATF monitors compliance with its detailed forty recommendations.
The Council of Europe and Inter-American Conventions are quite
broad, while the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is narrowly focused. Thus, any monitoring system will have to fit the unique circumstances of the situation. Based on past success, however, monitoring systems are increasingly prevalent and recommended for
consideration in implementing international agreements.
D. AN EXAMPLE OF THE MUTUAL EVALUATION SYSTEM

Different approaches have been taken over the years to promote
progress in carrying out multilateral treaties and agreements. Mutual
evaluation is increasingly turned to because it serves as a way to
promote and monitor progress, while it minimizes the need for new,
permanent, and perhaps costly bureaucracies. It engages many more
professional experts with credibility and expertise to address complex issues.
While the concept of mutual evaluation has existed for some time,
recent experience in the anti-money laundering area is probably the
most useful for understanding the concept and processes. Essentially,

2000]

EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE

mutual evaluation in this area has the following characteristics. First,
representatives from all signatory countries meet regularly to discuss
issues and review progress on implementing an agreed upon set of
recommendations.49 Each country is required to submit regular progress reports that are discussed in the meetings. Shortcomings and
successes receive equal attention. Second, on a regular basis, a team
of three to four experts from different professional backgrounds is
drawn from each of the participating nations to conduct an in-depth,
on-site evaluation of a nation's progress. This is important because
simply examining laws and reports cannot assess actual compliance.
Preliminary questionnaires are completed by the nation to serve as an
aid in better focusing a three to four day on-site assessment visit. A
member of the Secretariat also is included on the team to ensure consistency and assist in the final drafting of a report.
Third, the review teams speak with public and private officials involved in implementing the agreement or who have a useful vantage
point upon which to judge progress. A draft report is shared with the
host nation, which has the opportunity to discuss its content before a
final product is produced for review by all participating nations. Due
to the potential sensitivity of the evaluation report, only a carefully
drafted summary is made available to the public. The full report,
however, is available to all participants. If shortcomings are identified, the evaluated nation will report at subsequent meetings on steps
taken to address them. Finally, periodic evaluation serves to maintain
momentum for the implementation of the agreement as well as to increase knowledge and understanding.
In sum, as every nation goes through the process, there is mutual
respect and consideration by all participants involved. The key to the
success of mutual evaluation is that each nation is equal at the table,
the evaluations are conducted by experts, and each participating nation agrees to abide by the same procedures.

49. A small Secretariat (3-4 people) is responsible for providing logistics, continuity, and materials, but the primary work of the organization is carried out by
the government representatives who attend the meetings.
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VIII. COMMENTS BY THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO TO THE OAS
BY AMBASSADOR CLAUDE HELLER"

I first want to thank you for your kind invitation to make a few
brief remarks on an issue that is occupying an increasingly prominent
place in the international agenda. Not a day goes by without the media reporting on an issue linked to corruption, a phenomenon that
crosses borders, contaminates political systems, and weakens institutions. No country is exempt from the corrosive effects of corruption.
All too often, the problem of corruption is erroneously perceived as a
disease of the developing world. In this, as in all issues, double standards must be avoided. In all our nations, the recognition of the
negative impact of corruption on economic, social, and political development has led to legislative and institutional reforms designed to
foster greater transparency and accountability. At the same time,
civil society has played a vital role in promoting change and awareness of the problem; but much remains to be done.
Allow me to take this opportunity to refer to what, in my view,
should be a fundamental element of the Inter-American agenda and
to underline, in that regard, the value of multilateral cooperation in
our efforts. The democratization of political life in the Americas, the
renewed confidence in the multilateral approach to deal with problems that transcend national frontiers, the progressive consolidation
of the Rule of Law, and the demands of an increasingly interdependent international environment explain in large measure the new dynamism in Inter-American relations.
An overview of today's hemispheric agenda reveals the many issues with a transnational impact on which multilateral approaches
are being developed and implemented: drug control, the promotion
and protection of human rights, the fight against impunity, natural
disaster prevention, terrorism, the illicit production and trafficking of
firearms, are just a few of the more prominent ones. The proliferation
of international instruments, new intergovernmental bodies, and cooperation mechanisms to address common problems, is a reflection

50. Permanent Representative of Mexico to the OAS.
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of an increasing recognition of the role of international cooperation
in any effective strategy.
It is evident that the multilateral approach is not a substitute for
national efforts, but rather, a necessary complement. Although the
primary responsibility in addressing a particular problem rests on
each State, isolated national efforts, by themselves, are insufficient.
The limits of multilateral action have been evident when imposition
and confrontation have been chosen over dialogue and negotiation.
This has been the case, for example, in the fight against drugs, where
widespread rejection of existing unilateral measures has led to a new
effort based on the recognition of the benefits of cooperation over
confrontation. The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism, recently approved by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
("CICAD"), brings together all the Member States of the OAS in a
collective effort whose main objective is to strengthen cooperation as
the only way to effectively address a common problem of great magnitude.
Because of its transnational dimension, effective action against
corruption must combine national efforts with multilateral strategies.
In the Americas, the legal framework for multilateral efforts is based
upon the Inter-American Convention, ratified to date by seventeen of
the thirty-four Member States of the OAS. The low number of ratifications, to date, is a matter of great concern. Full ratification and implementation of this important instrument has to be a priority objective. The OAS, through its Inter-American Cooperation Program on
Combating Corruption, and agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank, are playing important roles. In this regard, I would
like to underline the urgent need for full ratification of this pioneer
Convention, whatever its limitations may be, before the InterAmerican community can move forward on further important new
steps.
In the new dynamics of Inter-American relations, the question
raised by this Seminar, on what constitutes an effective multilateral
approach, is a useful one. Whether one is speaking about fighting
corruption, or addressing any issue in the Inter-American agenda,
experience has demonstrated that several basic conditions must be
met.
The multilateral approach must build a strong consensus based on
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a set of mutually-agreed principles, procedures, and objectives.
Common understanding of all of the actors involved on the nature of
the problem and on the fundamental premises that will guide any
multilateral effort to address it is an essential first step. The multilateral approach should also be fully compatible with the principles of
International Law in order for it to be both juridically and politically
legitimate. Without ignoring the asymmetries between States in our
Hemisphere, the multilateral approach must involve all States on an
equal footing, with each assuming the same rights and responsibilities. It must be applicable to all States, without exception. In addition, the multilateral approach must be credible and seek to build
mutual trust. It must, therefore, be transparent, impartial, and equitable. Finally, the multilateral approach must be geared toward
strengthening cooperation as the only effective way to address common problems. It should, therefore, exclude confrontational approaches that undermine joint efforts. It is not just a question of publishing lists and rankings with great media impact, that often
oversimplify the nature of a very complex issue, reinforce prejudices,
and generate artificial distinctions between good and bad. On the
contrary, it must encourage cooperation to correct that which does
not work.
The legitimacy and credibility of any multilateral approach rests
necessarily on the acceptance by everyone involved of the basic rules
of the game. As we work toward strengthening our national capabilities and multilateral strategies against corruption, the lessons learned
in other fields can contribute toward the effectiveness of these efforts. Only true partnership based on a common understanding of the
issue at hand and on clearly identified objectives has the possibility
of success in the Inter-American community in the years to come.
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IX. MAKING ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATIES
WORK: COMMENTS ON THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE' S ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK
BY PETER CSONKA'

A. INTRODUCTION

The Council of Europe is relatively well known for its role in protecting human rights, mainly because of the judgments of our European Court of Human Rights. However, and this is perhaps less
known to the general public, our organization has also been very dynamic in the legal field. So far, 175 international treaties and agreements and a countless number of recommendations and other pieces
of soft law have been concluded within the Council. Many of these
instruments deal with international cooperation in legal matters. I
would like to stress, in particular, that we have developed a comprehensive network of legal instruments that form the basis of today's
European cooperation against crime. These instruments include extradition, mutual legal assistance, execution of judgments, transfer of
prisoners, and one of the latest treaties, the Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption, deals specifically with the problem of corruption.
Launched at the nineteenth Conference of European Ministers of
Justice, in Malta in 1994, the Council of Europe's activities against
corruption received considerable attention at the second Summit of
Heads of State and Government in October 1997, where it became a
top priority for our organization and our Member States.
B. IN GENERAL
Several features characterize the Council of Europe's approach to
the fight against corruption. First, our approach is multidisciplinary.
Corruption is a prism with many sides and requires action of different types, for example legal and non-legal. Legal measures should
include criminal, civil, and administrative law measures. Second, our
approach incorporates a monitoring mechanism. The credibility of
instruments against corruption depends upon an appropriate system
51. Administrator, Economic and Organized Crime Unit and Directorate of Legal Affairs, Council of Europe.
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for evaluating compliance with the obligations arising therefrom. All
Council of Europe instruments are linked to the monitoring mechanism provided by the agreement known as the Group of States
Against Corruption ("GRECO").
Third, the Council of Europe's approach is ambitious. Corruption
is a serious and complex problem. It evokes in citizens profound
feelings of distrust, unfairness, and inequality; thereby undermining
their faith in the foundations of society, provoking a waste of scarce
public resources, and increasing the cost of public services. It is a
vehicle for organized criminal groups to infiltrate political institutions and the legal economy and to launder dirty money. Our efforts
are directed, therefore, to raising public life standards, without leaving gaps through which corrupt practices may survive or reappear.
The Council of Europe seeks to tackle all forms of corrupt behavior
in order to preserve the integrity and impartiality of public administration and the social fabric. Fourth, our approach is comprehensive.
We are developing an integrated set of instruments of different types,
with a view to building up a network of standards that will render
corruption more difficult and costly. Finally, our approach is flexible.
Countries are given the time and the means to adapt to new international standards, to choose the instrument to sign, to apply soft law
or, through a system of reservations and declarations, to postpone acceptance of some commitments.
C. OVERVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTION ON
CORRUPTION

The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was adopted in November 1998 and opened for signature in January 1999. Presently,
thirty countries have signed and two have ratified it. It is important to
note that it is open to the accession of Council of Europe Member
States and of non-member States that participated in its drafting,
such as the United States, Japan, Canada, and Mexico. Becoming a
party to the Convention implies automatic submission to GRECO's
monitoring procedures.
From a substantive point of view, this Convention is one of the
most comprehensive treaties in the field of corruption. It covers a
large range of corruption offenses, including: active and passive corruption of national, foreign, and international public officials; active
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and passive corruption of members of national, international, and supranational parliaments or assemblies; active and passive corruption
of judges and staff of domestic, international, or supranational
courts; active and passive private corruption; active and passive
trading in influence, involving national and foreign public officials,
laundering of corruption proceeds, and corruption in auditing.
In addition, the Convention deals with substantive and procedural
law issues, such as jurisdiction, sanctions and measures, liability of
legal persons, establishing specialized authorities for the fight against
corruption, co-operation among authorities responsible for law enforcement and control, and protection of witnesses and persons cooperating with the judicial authorities. Finally, it provides for enhanced international cooperation in the prosecution of the corruption
offenses defined thereon, in particular, regarding extradition, mutual
judicial assistance, and the exchange of spontaneous information.
One of the main characteristics of this Convention is its broad scope,
which reflects the Council of Europe's comprehensive approach to the
fight against corruption as a threat to democratic values, the rule of
law, human rights, and social and economic progress. This is clearly
reflected in the range of offenses covered by the Convention. The
Council of Europe Convention imposes, like the OECD and European Union Conventions on corruption, an obligation to establish as
criminal offenses the bribery of foreign and international public officials, judges, and members of parliament. The elements of these offenses are identical to those pertaining to the bribery of domestic officials or members of parliament. The Council of Europe
Convention, however, is notably broader, in that it also covers the
passive side of bribery and public officials and parliamentarians of
all countries, regardless of whether they are Council of Europe Convention Member States or Contracting Parties to the Convention.
Moreover, the distinctive approach of the Council of Europe Convention can be more clearly appreciated by referring to its provisions
dealing with some additional offenses, which are completely ignored
by the other Conventions, such as active and passive bribery in the
private sector and trading in influence.
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D. OVERVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE GROUP OF
STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION-A MONITORING MECHANISM

On May 5, 1998, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, at its 10 2 "d Ministerial Session adopted a resolution permitting the setting up of the GRECO, in the form of a Partial and Enlarged Agreement.
GRECO aims at improving the capacity of its member States to
fight corruption by following up, through a dynamic and flexible
process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure, compliance with
their undertakings in this field and, in particular, with the twenty
Guiding Principles for the fight against corruption. GRECO also
strives to assure that there is effective implementation of our Criminal law Convention and other international legal instruments to be
adopted.
GRECO is open to the participation of member States and nonmember States of the Council of Europe on an equal footing. Indeed,
an effective fight against corruption requires broad international participation to eliminate this blight on society. Some non-European
countries, like the United States, Canada, and Japan, have been
highly active in the drafting of the GRECO Agreement. This role
was recognized by the Agreement's preamble and by the privilege
extended to them to become members of GRECO, on an "equal
footing" with Council of Europe member States. I would like to take
this opportunity to launch a strong appeal to these countries, and especially to the United States, to join GRECO as soon as practicable.
GRECO aims to provide a flexible, dynamic, and efficient mechanism for compliance with undertakings in the field of corruption. It
defines a master-type procedure, which can be adapted to the different instruments under review. Becoming a Party to the Criminal Law
Convention or other instruments will entail, automatically, the obligation to participate in GRECO and to accept monitoring procedures
defined under the GRECO system.
In order to carry out its tasks, GRECO will conduct evaluation
procedures for each of its members. For each evaluation round,
GRECO will start by selecting specific provisions on which the
evaluation procedure will be based. It will visit the countries concerned, for the purpose of seeking information concerning its law
and practice. After receiving comments by the member undergoing
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the evaluation, GRECO will adopt a report stating to what extent that
country is fulfilling its international undertakings. It may address
specific recommendations to member countries with a view to improving its domestic laws and practice. If appropriate, a public
statement will be issued when a member remains passive or takes insufficient action in response to GRECO's recommendations.
According to GRECO's Statute, GRECO becomes operational as
soon as fourteen States join. At present, 23 countries have joined
GRECO, and the first Sessions of GRECO took place in September
and November 1999 in order to finalize GRECO's rules of procedure. We hope, and expect, that GRECO will rapidly become a permanent forum for debating and improving, through mutual evaluation and peer-pressure, anti-corruption policies and measures
throughout Europe and beyond.

X. THE MUTUAL EVALUATION PROCESS OF THE
CARIBBEAN FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
BY CALVIN WILSON'-

The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force ("CFATF") is an organization of states of the Caribbean basin that have agreed to implement common counter-measures to address the problem of criminal money laundering. The Mutual Evaluation Program is a crucial
aspect of the work of the CFATF as it is one of the mechanisms by
which the Secretariat ensures that member State compliance is fulfilled. Through this monitoring mechanism, the wider membership is
kept informed regarding developments in each Member Country that
has signed the Memorandum of Understanding. For the individual
member, the Mutual Evaluation Program presents a valuable opportunity for an objective assessment by a team of experts of the anti
money laundering framework as it exists at the time of the visit.
The Mutual Evaluation Exercise is not a trial, but rather a constructive consultative dialogue between professionals, be they bank
supervisors/regulators, legal officers, members of the Defense Force,
or Police and Customs Departments. The aim is to assist the Member
State to improve its anti-money laundering framework so that the
52. Executive Director Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
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legislation, administrative procedures, programs, and policies are in
compliance with the forty FATF and nineteen CFATF recommendations.
The Program seeks to give due recognition where the standard
benchmarks are met, but with a view to securing improvements
where necessary; identifies weaknesses that have been detected; and,
makes recommendations where they are found to exist. The mutual
evaluation process entails the completion of a questionnaire on implementation followed by a mission to each of the Member Countries
by a team of experts, one each in the fields of Law, Finance, and
Law Enforcement; and led by the Director or Deputy Director of the
Secretariat.
Through a range of interviews with officials in both the private
and public sectors, the team attempts to glean a precise picture of the
country's anti-money laundering framework at the particular time.
Crucial to this undertaking is the need for a national agency, within
the Member State, headed by a coordinator, who could be a legal officer with no ministerial responsibility, who will be responsible for
the coordination of the mutual evaluation process.
It is necessary for all Government departments and agencies, as
well as those private sector organizations that will be called upon to
participate in the evaluation, to inform all related officials of the nature, rationale, and importance of the exercise. The CFATF experience has been that Members, by virtue of the Mutual Evaluation Report, have been able to implement improvements in their legislation,
regulations, and international obligations through the recommendations of the Examiners.

XI. BEST PRACTICES IN MULTILATERAL
IMPLEMENTATION
BY VICTORIA

H. FIGGE 53

First of all, I wish to thank Messrs. Grossman, Ferrand, and
Schloss for their kind invitation to participate in this important event;
and, particularly, Mr. Stanley Morris, my colleague, for his role in
53. Partner, BERG (Latin America) Inc., Panama; former Director of the
Panamanian Financial Analysis Unit
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this invitation. It is indeed an honor to participate and I trust that I
shall be able to give you my insight in the different discussions that
will take place. Panama, as a member of the Caribbean Financial
Action Task Force, was subject to a Mutual Evaluation in 1996. Our
experience was quite interesting. The process started when the Secretariat of the CFATF sent a questionnaire that inquired whether the
country was complying with the forty Recommendations of the
FATF and requested copies of appropriate legislation.
At the time, I co-chaired the Presidential High-Level Committee
on Money Laundering Prevention ("Committee") of Panama, which
was mandated to design the Drug Related Anti-Money Laundering
Policy, write its laws and suggest these to the President and oversee,
on his behalf, its implementation. This committee consisted of professionals selected by the President of the Republic from both the
private and the public sector, namely, bankers, lawyers and Colon
Free Zone businessmen and their counterparts in the public sector.
The Committee reviewed the aforementioned questionnaire and
sent it to the Secretariat of the CFATF. After some months we were
advised that three CFATF professionals would come to Panama to do
an on-site evaluation. The Committee was advised to accommodate
the three evaluators and make sure that they had access to all relevant
facilities from both the private and the public sectors. The CFATF
professionals visited the Banking Commission, now the Superintendent of Banks, the General Attorney's Office, the Drug Prosecutors
Office, several banks, and the Colon Free Zone Administration, as
well as the Colon Free Zone Users Association. To my knowledge
the CFATF professionals were received cordially and all questions
were answered.
A few months later, we received the draft of the CFATF's findings, which was again discussed and reviewed at the High Level
Committee, and certain observations and clarifications were returned
by us. During the following plenary meeting, Panama's evaluation
was presented and it was certified that we complied with the forty
recommendations of the CFATF.
In my opinion, this type of evaluation process-by professionals
from peer countries-is the best way to ensure that a country is progressing in anti-money laundering legislation and its implementation.
During its evaluation, Panama received important feedback from the
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CFATF and they also learned from us. There was no punitive feeling, but rather a feeling of full cooperation and understanding. The
findings were not published on the Internet, nor were the findings the
subject of newspaper headlines worldwide.
At the conclusion of the evaluation process, Panama was fully
motivated to continue improving. If you compare the foregoing
evaluation process to the unilateral evaluation process, the "Certification System" applied to all countries by the United States of
America, there are several obvious points to consider: (1) unilateral
versus multilateral; (2) punitive versus cooperative; (3) political versus technical; and (4) public versus private.
I just want to leave you with the foregoing ideas and impressions,
so that you may consider a similar type of multilateral evaluation
when every country has ratified and implemented the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption. I strongly believe that the private
sector should be involved in stimulating governments to ratify and
implement the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. In
this era of globalization, the private sector should institute transparent policies to assist in the evaluation of companies and they should
play a fundamental role in helping their government in the right direction. The private sector has played an important role in the decision making process in Panama, which contributed to our successful
adoption of new laws, especially in the area of money laundering
prevention and detection.

XII. FINDINGS, CONSIDERATIONS,
AND
5 4
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FINDINGS
1. Corruption remains a serious problem in all nations, affecting
all parts of society. While some progress has been made, much
more needs to be done if lasting progress is to be accomplished.

54. The conference participants, at the conclusion of the Experts Roundtable
Conference, drafted these "Findings, Considerations, and Recommendations."
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2. Corruption has many damaging aspects, including political and
economic competition.
3. Corruption is a national and transnational problem and to address it requires national action and collective, multilateral action as well.
4. The Inter-American Convention against Corruption is an important and innovative multilateral instrument for addressing
the issue of corruption in the Western Hemisphere.
5. All countries should sign, ratify and fully implement the Convention.
6. The ratification of the Convention and enactment of laws are
not sufficient; steps must be taken to ensure their real application and enforcement.
7. Different models for multilateral cooperation have been developed, both inside and outside of the region, that provide valuable principles and practices consistent with international law
that are relevant to the fight against corruption.
8. Unilateral assessments are not constructive. Multilateral approaches are preferable; these should be based on consent,
mutual respect and the general principles of international law.
9. Notwithstanding the absence of ratification of the Convention
by some states, there are other international obligations relevant to the issue of corruption, such as international human
rights norms and agreements on financial cooperation.
10. Civil society and the private sector have a central role to play
in the struggle against corruption and in promoting transparency and integrity.
11. Freedom of expression has a critical part in the struggle against
corruption.
12. Regular and timely publication of information as well as a
right of access to information are critical tools for combating
corruption. Regular use of the Internet and other mediums can
play a valuable role.
13. There is a need for effective coordination among the various
multilateral efforts to combat corruption being undertaken by
the OAS, OECD, COE, IMF, World Bank, IDB, UN, etc. In
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their evaluation of states' anti-corruption reform efforts, multilateral organizations should take the progress achieved into
consideration.
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL MULTILATERAL
COOPERATION

1. Successful efforts to promote compliance with multilateral
agreements require cooperation and commitment from the nations involved, including clear goals and a comprehensive
strategy.
2. There should be flexibility in developing an approach and it
should be tailored to the unique needs of the region, each nation, and the subject matter.
3. All members of such a multilateral group must participate as
peers.
4. Full participation should be contingent upon acceptance of the
international obligations involved.
5. Discussions should be constructive and actions taken by the
group must strengthen the process and not be punitive or vindictive.
6. Decisions should be arrived at through consensus and all procedures should be viewed as being fair and universally applied.
There is an important role to be played by objective, fair and
technically sound expertise.
7. There must be a careful balance between confidentiality and
transparency.
8. There should be the fullest possible involvement of civil society and the private sector.
9. Multilateral organisms such as the World Bank, OAS, IDB,
and bilateral donors should provide technical and financial assistance necessary for countries to achieve full implementation
of the Convention.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All member states of the OAS should promptly sign, ratify,
and fully and effectively implement and enforce the Conven-
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tion. All member states of the OAS should develop programs
designed to raise public awareness of the impact of corruption
and to increase the participation of civil society and the private
sector in promoting probity and public ethics. The OAS should
promote these objectives.
2. OAS member states should promote multilateral cooperation
in the fight against corruption. State parties of the Convention
should create a multilateral monitoring mechanism to promote
implementation and enforcement of the Convention. The
mechanism should draw on models in the hemisphere and beyond, taking into account the considerations above, including
participation on an equal footing by all state parties to the
Convention.
3. The functions of this mechanism would include the exchange
of information, the development of technical cooperation, and
the conduct of regular evaluations of the parties' effective implementation of the Convention, through a peer review process. Evaluation teams should be composed of experts proposed
by state parties to the Convention and should perform in a fair,
objective and technically sound fashion.
4. The mechanism should operate on a consensus basis with the
fullest respect for all participants. The evaluation of implementation and enforcement should be fair and objective.
5. Parties to the Convention should create a permanent secretariat
with technically qualified staff and adequate budget.
6. The evaluation of compliance should be open and transparent
taking into account legitimate needs for confidentiality.
7. Adequate procedures of consultation with the private sector
and civil society should be devised and implemented in order
to ensure appropriate input and communication.
8. Progress should be reported annually to the OAS General Assembly and to the public.
9. Multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, OAS, and
the IDB, as well as bilateral donors, should provide technical
and financial assistance necessary for countries to achieve
these objectives.

